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Abstract: 
 
By considering different systems of legal protection this study examines the impact of capital 
structure on the performance of listed firms in European region. Based on 5050 listed firms 
in eight European countries, the results of the study reveal that the owners in low level of 
legal protection are more likely to use the capital structure of the firms in order to serve 
their proper interests. In high level of legal protection, the market based system and the 
debts are enrolled to constraint the expropriation of private benefits.       
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1.  Introduction  
 
In the last years we have witnessed the development of financial theories that reveal 
the importance and the impact of financial structure on the performance. Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) are the first that have tentatively studied the impact of capital 
structure. In their studies they demonstrate that the value of a firm is independent of 
its capital structure and consequently there is no correlation between leverage and 
firm’s value in a world without tax and transactions costs. After five years, the 
authors have revealed the positive impact of leveraged firms in the case of tax 
deductible on interests’ payments. Under this condition, the firms should increase 
the debt to full the value by maximizing the interest tax shield. 
 
After the development of the irrelevant works of Modigliani and Miller many other 
theories have been trying to explain the impact of capital structure such as the 
pecking order theory, the free cash-flow theory, the trade-off theory and the agency 
cost theory.  Through the agency cost theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose 
the usage of debt as a disciplinary tool to ensure the performance of managerial staff 
specifically when control and ownership are separated. Thus high debt ratio leads to 
reduce the free cash-flow waste by managers (Jensen, 1986). Stulz (1990) confirms 
this concept by indicating that the reduction of free cash-flow may decrease the level 
of profitable investments. Under these opposite situations, firms have to adjust 
dynamically their capital structures against the adjustment of benefits. Accordingly, 
the trade-off theory (Myers, 1984) states that the benefits and costs of financial 
sources must be traded off until the benefits of debts are offset the costs of debts. 
In 1997, Myers presented a model in which he stated that debt may cause 
underinvestment in future opportunities, specifically when debt-holders capture all 
the return of the investment while shareholders bear most of the cost. In this 
situation debts will have a negative impact on firm’s value by creating a conflict 
between shareholders and debt-holders. Therefore, Myers suggests the usage of 
short-term debt due to its maturity before the investment decision. Baltas et al. 
(2013) suggested a PVAR methodology for liquidity creation.  
 
The packing order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) comes to complicate the 
evidence of capital structure by indicating that firms should finance their 
investments in a hierarchal method using the retained earnings followed by external 
financing. When external financing is required, debt will be preferred before issuing 
new equity. La porta et al. (1998) and Claessens et al. (2000) highlight the 
complexities of managing the capital structure by considering the macro 
environment system such as the legal protection which can explain why some firms 
are financed differently in different countries. For the authors a high level of 
regulation and legal protection may influence agency conflicts by recognizing many 
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constraints to external financing. Oppositely, a low level of protection and 
regulation may increase the level of expropriation through the external financing.  
Based on the contradictory results, we will study in this paper the interaction 
between capital structure and the performance of European listed firms by 
considering the different regimes of legal protection. This provides an opportunity to 
investigate if the macro environment system in Europe rises as determinant key for 
the financial behaviour. Moreover, it helps to renew the debate on capital structure 
based on new data extracted at the end of 2012. Therefore, the main purpose of this 
study is to evaluate the complex impact of the capital structure on the performance 
of European listed firms. The second purpose is to explore if there is any impact of 
the country’s legal system on the financial behaviour.  
 
To address this issue, we begin this study by exploring the different regulations in 
Europe. We end up by dividing the European countries to three different families of 
legal regimes: the French civil law countries, the English common law countries and 
finally the German civil law countries
2
. This classification is used to reveal the 
impact of financial structure on the performance by considering why some firms are 
financed differently in different countries. 
 
The first next section of this paper explains the impact of capital structure on the 
financial performance. Section two describes the legal regimes and their impacts on 
the financial behaviour. Section three analyses the interaction between ownership 
and capital structures. Sections four and five explain the methodology and describe 
the collected data. Finally, sections six and seven represent respectively the analyses 
and the discussions concerning the capital structure in different legal traditions.      
 
2. Capital Structure and Financial Performance 
 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is based on the idea that managers 
(agents) will not watch over the businesses of a firm as the owners (principals). The 
fundamental element behind this theory is the separation between ownership and 
management which may increase the conflicts and consequently the agency costs by 
moving each entity to achieve its specific interests. 
 
For Jensen (1986), the excess of free cash-flow is the most important cause of 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. Accordingly, he proposes to mitigate 
the opportunistic behaviour of a manager by increasing the debt ratio. In this case, 
debt will have a positive impact on firms’ value through the pressure to generate 
cash flow in order to payback the debt with its interest.  
 
                                                 
2 The same classification has been used by La Porta et al. (1998). 
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Due to the positive correlation between higher debt levels and higher financial 
distress, Harris and Raviv (1991), have confirmed that debt can act as a monitoring 
and incentive device.  
In 2003, Sarkar and Zapatero found the same positive impact of debt on the 
profitability. Frank and Goyal (2003), have argued that firms with high debt ratios 
are less correlated with financial deficit. Moreover, Margaritis and Psillaki (2009) 
have confirmed the free cash flow theory by reporting that firms with high leverage 
are lesser able to invest in projects showing negative net present value.  
 
Hence, it can be argued that a high level of debt can be used as a tool to enhance the 
control (Dewatripont and Tirol, 1994), by forcing firms to distribute free cash-flow 
(Jensen, 1986).  
 
While some studies and theories have reported a positive impact of debt on the 
performance, some other studies have found a negative relationship between debt’s 
level and financial performance. For example, Myers (1984) predicts a negative 
relationship between debt and performance because firms will prefer to finance new 
investments with internal funds rather than external funds, but when external finance 
is required firms prefer debt above equity. Shyman-Sunder and Myers (1999) have 
confirmed this hierarchical model of financing using the data of listed firms in 
NYSE between 1971 and 1989.  
 
Many other researchers in this stream confirm the negative impact of debt. In 2002, 
Chiang et al. and Eriotis et al.  revealed a negative impact of debt on the 
performance measured by the profitability. In the same line, Abor (2005) has found 
that high long-term debt is negatively correlated to the profitability in Ghana. The 
same results have been observed by Bhagat and Bolton (2008) in US then by Ghosh 
(2008) in India. Thalassinos et al. (2010) have observed strong relation among 
country risk and the current crisis. Thalassinos and Politis (2011) have analysed 
international stock markets to check for cointegration between the markets. 
Thalassinos and Pociovalisteanu (2007) have used a time series model to check 
possible relation among stock prices and profits in the Romanian stock exchange.  
 
As for the relation between the expropriation and the usage of debt, many studies 
tend to point to the presence of expropriation. Recently, Bai et al. (2013) have 
reported a positive and significant relationship between expropriation and debt usage 
of the Chinese firms. The authors measure the amount of expropriation by 
aggregating the value of corporate loans made to the controlling shareholder. This 
result is consistent with the prior study of Faccio et al. (2001) in which they had 
argued that higher leverage ensures for the controlling shareholder more resources to 
expropriate the private benefits without diluting his controlling. 
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The theories and the empirical studies have documented mixed and significant 
results which lead us to formulate the following hypothesis:  
H0: There is a significant impact of leverage on the performance of listed firms. 
 
 
 
3. The Interaction between Financial Behaviours and Macro Environment 
Systems 
 
3-1-French Civil Law  
 
The basis of French civil law is identified by the French revolution in the 19
th
 
century.  The development of France in the colonial era and the dissolve of the 
Portuguese - Spanish empires have extended the French civil law to many nations 
such as: Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portuguese and Switzerland.       
 
For La Porta et al. (1998) the French civil law countries have the worst legal 
protections due to some criteria such as: the highest level of concentrated ownership, 
the highest level of deviation from the principle one-share/one-vote and the lowest 
incidence of allowing voting by mail.  
 
In this circumstance of low legal protections, a high level of debt may be used to 
increase tunnelling and expropriation of the outside shareholders. Accordingly, 
Bebchuk et al. (2000) have pointed out that a low level of legal protection leads to 
increase the tunnelling in leveraged CMS
3
. Bertrand et al. (2002) have argued the 
same results in the case of pyramid structure. Under such a pyramidal structure, the 
ultimate owner has the ability to use debt in order to expropriate resources from 
affiliated companies to those higher up the pyramid. In the same context of French 
civil law, Boubaker (2007) has reported that the external financing eases the 
expropriation of outside shareholders. 
 
In 2001, Faccio et al. revealed that the absence of transparency and disclosures 
norms enable the owners to use debt more effectively to extract private benefits, 
which has a negative impact on stocks’ valuations. Consistent with these results, 
Johnson et al. (2000) have found that weak legal protection has an important role to 
play in stock market declines. Therefore, when the legal protection is very weak, 
debt fails to serve its disciplinary role and becomes a tool for the owners to 
expropriate the resources of the company. 
 
3-2-English Common Law 
                                                 
3 Controlling-minority structure: places corporate control in the hands of an insider who holds a small 
fraction of the firm’s cash-flow rights. 
108 
European Research Studies, XVII (3), 2014 
H. El-Chaarani 
 
 
According to the principle in which it is unfair to treat similar facts differently, the 
English common law has been formed by judges through decisions of courts. The 
common law has its roots with the English colonists in some countries such as: US, 
Canada, Hong-Kong and Australia. In European countries, Ireland was the subject of 
the first extension of common law system outside the United-kingdom. 
To prove the importance of common law, La Porta et al. (1998) have reported that 
countries with English common law afford the strongest protection for minority 
investors. In their papers (1998, 1999 and 2000), the authors have found that the 
common law is characterized by the highest incidence of law protecting oppressed 
minorities. Moreover, they have reported that the common law has the highest 
average anti-director rights score. Finally, La Porta el al. (1998) have revealed many 
significant differences between common law and civil law, indicating that a strong 
legal protection decreases the risk of expropriation. In 1995, Zingales confirmed that 
the English common law reduces the ability to extract the private benefits by 
limiting the discretionary power of a manager
4
.  
 
In this case of legal protection, a high level of debt can act as a disciplining device 
(Sarkar et al. 2008), by aligning the interests of shareholders with the interests of 
managers (Jensen, 1986). For Day and Taylor (2004), the effectiveness of debt as 
monitoring device depends on the institutional context such as the effective 
bankruptcy laws. Consistent with these results, it can be argued that the disciplinary 
role of debt is sensitive to the legal protection of the country. In the case of high 
level of protection, the debt can be used to reduce minorities’ expropriation and 
increase a firm’s performance.     
 
3-3-German and Scandinavian (GS) Civil Law 
 
German and Scandinavian codes are derived from Roman legal tradition, the most 
developed one around the world.  The German codes had an important influence on 
the legal regulations in many European countries such as Switzerland and Austria. 
However, the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway) 
have a distinct civil law which is derived from German Law. In our study, we will 
consider the German and Scandinavian civil law in the same family of regulations 
based on the civil legal regulation. Consistent with this reasoning, La Porta et al. 
(1998) have reported that German and Scandinavian civil law countries are in the 
middle in term of legal protection. Their results show that common law countries 
have the strongest level of protection while civil law countries have the weakest 
level. Dyck and Zingales (2001) have reported that the private benefits are highest in 
countries with French code (21%) then countries with German and Scandinavian 
                                                 
4 In 2001, Dyck and Zingales reported that the levels of private benefits are significantly lower in 
countries with English legal origins than in French legal origin countries. 
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legal origins (11% and 4%). Their results have confirmed the importance of legal 
rights in any cross country analysis. For the authors, a higher level of legal 
protection must be accompanied with lower level of financial distress. Nenova 
(2001), has confirmed the midmost level of German civil law protection. The author 
has found that the private benefits are 4.5% in common law countries, 25.4% in 
French civil law countries and 16.2% in German legal origin countries.     
 
Based on the different regimes of legal protection, the hypotheses H1 and H2 are 
defined as follows: 
H1: In the case of low legal protection, there is a negative impact of leverage on the 
performance of listed firms. 
H2: In the case of high legal protection, there is a positive impact of leverage on the 
performance of listed firms. 
 
4. The Interaction between Financial Behaviours and Business Micro Factors 
 
In some cases of legal protection the ultimate owners can expropriate the outside 
minorities by beating some regulations through the structuring of legal transactions. 
For example, in many European countries the pyramid structure appears if there are 
many restrictions concerning the usage of dual class share. Accordingly, it’s very 
difficult to detect the impact of financial structure on the performance without 
considering some micro factors such as: the ownership concentration and the 
deviation from the principle of one share-one vote. 
 
The logic behind this assumption has been supported by many scholars. For 
example, Filatotchev et al. (2001) have reported that ownership structure may 
provide an incentive to the ultimate owners to expropriate the minority when the 
investment project is funded by debt. Brailsford et al. (2002) have stated that 
managers seek to reduce their risks and they use less debt at high level of ownership 
concentration. Du and Dai (2005) have revealed also that owners with small 
proportion of shares tend to increase debts to acquire more resources. Boubaker 
(2007) has confirmed that the level of expropriation is very high in the French firms, 
specifically when shareholders own a small part of cash-flow rights. 
 
As for the deviation between cash-flow rights and control rights, prior studies show 
that tunnelling and expropriation activities through debts increase in firms with high 
ratio of deviation between cash-flow and control rights. In 2002, Claessens et al. 
(2002) completed the study of Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) by indicating that 
the tunnelling by ultimate owners often takes place in firms in which there is a 
significant degree of divergence between cash flow rights and control rights. The 
same results have been observed by La Porta el al. (2002). Finally, Faccio et al. 
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(2002) and Masulis et al. (2009) have revealed that a high ratio of O/C
5
 and a weak 
creditors’ protection enable the owner to use the debt to extract the private benefits. 
 
When the weak legal system exacerbates the situation of owners, the ownership 
concentration rises as proxy system to mitigate the level of expropriation. Hence, the 
final two hypotheses of this study are defined as follows:    
H3: A high level of concentrated ownership reduces the risk of expropriation 
through debt. 
H4: A high level of deviation between ownership rights and control rights increases 
the risk of expropriation through debt. 
 
5. Data and Sample 
 
This study is based on a new database extracted from European countries at the end 
of 2012. As a starting point for the data collection, eight European countries from 
different regimes of legal protection have been selected in order to explore the 
impact of capital structure on the financial performance. From each regime of legal 
protection we used the richest countries based on the gross domestic product (GDP)
 
6
. France, Italy and Spain represent the French civil law countries; Austria, Germany 
and Switzerland represent the GS civil law countries and finally Ireland and UK 
represent the common law countries. The selected countries represent 77.7% of 
European countries GDP (table 1). 
 
Table 1: GDP(2012) per Country 
 
Regime French law countries GS civil law countries 
Common law 
countries 
Country 
Franc
e 
Italy Spain 
Germa
ny 
Austria 
Switzerl
and 
UK Ireland 
GDP 
(2012) 
2.61 2.01 1.32 3.42 0.394 0.491 2.446 0.210 
GDP % 
of 
Europea
n 
countrie
s  
15.7% 
12.1
% 
7.9% 20.6% 2.4% 3% 14.7% 1.3% 
 
From each country we collect the data of listed firms based on the world scope 
database. Overall, we have at the beginning 7501 listed companies extracted from 
eight European countries. There are three restrictions on this first sample. Firstly, we 
                                                 
5 The ratio of his ownership rights O to his control rights C. 
6 Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). 
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exclude banks and insurance companies to prevent their domination in our study. 
Secondly, we eliminate companies with missing data on ownership and financial 
structures. Finally, we exclude companies that are owned by the government.  
We end up with 5050 companies divided to three sets of samples for which we can 
trace the ultimate owner and where stock market data are available. The sample of 
Common law countries consists of 1667 listed firms, the sample of French law 
countries consists of 2698 listed firms and the sample of GS civil law countries 
consists of 685 listed firms.   
 
Table 2: Total number of Selected Companies per Regime of Legal Protection 
 
Regime 
French law 
 countries 
GS civil law  
Countries 
Common law 
countries 
Country France Italy Spain Germany Austria Switzerland UK Ireland 
# of listed companies 
2012 
862 279 3167 665 70 238 2179 42 
Market capitalization 
in Billion USD 
1823 480 995 1486 106 1079 3019 109 
# of selected 
companies per 
country 
592 175 1931 466 41 178 1639 28 
Total # of selected 
companies per 
regime of legal 
protection 
2698 685 1667 
 
Table 1 provides that the French civil law is the most important one in Europe due to 
its Economic contribution in term of GDP. The three richest countries extracted 
from the French civil low contribute 35.7% of Europe’s GDP while this contribution 
drops down to 16% for common law countries.  
The market capitalization of our three samples (table 2) is more developed in 
common law countries followed by French civil law countries then GS civil law 
countries. These results indicate that listed firms in common law countries 
specifically in London stock Exchange may have a direct and fast market reaction 
on their financial behaviour.         
 
6. Methodology and Variables 
 
The research methodology involves a quantitative analysis to identify the impact of 
capital structure on the performance of listed firms by considering the different 
regimes of legal protection. To address this issue, we run the two following 
regressions by focusing on both micro and macro factors of European firms: 
 
(eq.1) Q = ƒ[(DBT) + (DBT)*(OWN) + (DBT)*(O/C) + Xi] + ei 
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(eq.2) Q = ƒ[(DBT) + (DBT)*(OWN)2 + (DBT)*(O/C)2 + Xi] + ei  
 
Where ei is the stochastic error term and Xi denotes all the vector of control 
variables that can affect the performance such as: Firm size measured by the 
natural log of the book value of total assets. Firm age measured by the natural log 
of the number of years since the firm's inception. Firm growth is the annual growth 
rate in sales. 
 
The first model (eq.1) is used to determine the impact of financial debt (DBT: debt-
to-total assets ratio) on Tobin’s Q (Q)7. Further analysis of this regression is applied 
to reveal the combined effects of debt with the variables OWN (cash-flow 
concentration) and O/C (deviation between cash-flow and voting rights). If debt is 
employed as a disciplinary mechanism, we would expect a positive relationship 
between {(DBT)*(O/C)} and firm’s performance when O/C is used to extract 
private benefits. Otherwise, if the ownership concentration is the alternative 
disciplinary device, we will expect a positive and significant relationship between 
{(DBT)*(OWN)} and firm’s performance when debt is used to extract private 
benefits. 
 
The second regression (eq.2) is running to capture any possibility of non-monotonic 
relation. It should be noted that debt ratio may be non-linearly related to the 
performance when the variables (OWN) and (O/C) increase. On the one hand, 
higher deviation between ownership and performance might give the ultimate 
owners more power to expropriate through debt. On the other hand, higher cash-
flow rights might align the interests of controllers with those of minorities.     
We regress also the combined effect of financial structure and legal regime by 
dividing our sample into three subsamples. The first subsample includes the French 
civil law countries, the second one consists of the GS civil law countries and the last 
subsample includes the common law countries. The objective at this level is to 
detect the impact of financial structure on the performance by considering the 
specificity of each legal regime. 
 
7. Results  
 
7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
                                                 
7 Tobin’s Q = (EQ + PRE + DEBT)/(ASSETS) 
Where; EQ = the year-end market value of the firm's common stock; PREF = the year-end book value 
of the firm's preference shares (preferred stock); DEBT = the year-end book value of the firm's total 
debt; and ASSETS = the total assets employed by the firm. 
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Table 3 provides descriptive statistics dealing with the variables used in this study. 
The sample consists of eight European countries which are: France, Italy, Spain, 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, UK and Ireland.     
 
The firms in common law countries have the highest level of performance with the 
highest level of firm’s growth. The firms in GS law countries are in the second place 
in term of performance while the firms in French civil law are in the last place.  
Oppositely, in term of debt ratio the French civil law countries are in the first place, 
specifically the listed firms in Italy (0.387) and Spain (0.293). Thus highest debt 
ratio may be employed as a disciplinary device to reduce cash flow waste. The 
lowest level of debt ratio exists in UK and Ireland with respectively (0.173) and 
(0.161). Between the lowest and the highest debt ratio, firms in France, Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland come to have a mid-position.        
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q measured by the total of market value plus the 
book value of the firm's preference shares plus the book value of the firm's over the 
total assets employed by the firm. The independent variables are: DBT measured by 
total debt over total assets; OWN measured by cash flow concentration; O/C 
measured by the deviation between control and ownership; Fsize measured by the 
natural log of the book value of total assets; Fage measured by the natural log of the 
number of years since firm's inception; Fgrow is the annual growth rate in sales. 
 
Regime 
French law  
countries 
GS civil law  
countries 
Common law 
countries 
Country France Italy Spain Germany Austria Switzerland UK Ireland 
Tobin’s Q 1.624 1.193 1.181 1.935 1.622 1.801 2.094 1.902 
DBT 0.261 0.387 0.293 0.284 0.288 0.196 0.173 0.161 
OWN 0.448 0.467 0.425 0.458 0.531 0.378 0.359 0.407 
O/C 0.883 0.711 0.791 0.854 0.908 0.896 0.842 0.905 
FSize 6.187 4.893 4.667 6.213 4.709 4.954 6.001 4.486 
FAge 45.21 36.48 39.32 42.87 35.09 39.87 48.32 31.76 
FGrow 0.214 0.154 0.179 0.237 0.126 0.245 0.267 0.154 
N 592 175 1931 466 41 178 1639 28 
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As it can be seen from Table 3, the ownership is very concentrated in French civil 
law countries specifically in France (44.8%) and Italy (46.7%), while the lowest 
level of concentration exists in UK (35.9%) and Switzerland (37.8%). These results 
indicate that the firms in common law countries are wildly held corporations where 
owners have a very small part of controlling rights. However, unlike the wildly held 
corporations, the closely held corporations in French and GS civil law countries are 
controlled by the majority of shareholders such as families and financial institutions. 
Again, there is a considerable variation across countries in term of deviation 
between ownership and control. The descriptive statistics indicate that O/C ratio is at 
the highest level in GS civil law countries whereas the lowest level exists in Italy 
(0.711) and Spain (0.791). Through pyramids, multiple voting rights and weak legal 
environment in French civil law countries, controlling shareholders have a high 
incentive to expropriate non-controlling shareholders. 
 
Table 4 calculates the coefficients of correlations in order to demonstrate any 
meaningful link between all the variables of the study.     
The relationship between Tobin’s Q and firm’s growth is positive and significant 
whereas the relationship between performance and debt ratio is found as negative 
and statistically significant. In light of these results it seems that debt is not used as a 
disciplinary tool in European countries. The positive relationship between O/C and 
Debt reveals also the possibility of entrenchment specifically when the ultimate 
owner has a low cash flow concentration. The negative relationship between OWN 
and O/C may confirm our first findings.      
 
Table 4: Correlation Statistics 
 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q measured by the total of market value plus the 
book value of the firm's preference shares plus the book value of the firm's over the 
total assets employed by the firm. The independent variables are: DBT measured by 
total debt over total assets; OWN measured by cash flow concentration; O/C 
measured by the deviation between control and ownership; Fsize measured by the 
natural log of the book value of total assets; Fage measured by the natural log of the 
number of years since firm's inception; Fgrow is the annual growth rate in sales.   
  
Variables Tobin’s Q Debt OWN O/C Firm Size Firm Age Firm Growth 
Tobin’s Q 1       
DBT -0.032* 1      
OWN 0.115 -0.221 1     
O/C -0.328 0.129** -0.176* 1    
FSize 0.109 -0.045 0.035 -0.267 1   
FAge 0.185 0.106 -0.076 0.003 0.091* 1  
FGrow 0.254** -0.097 -0.064 0.051 0.022 -0.031 1 
                                  *correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
                                  **correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
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These evidences need further investigations; accordingly we will try to verify them 
in the next section by the regressions analysis.   
 
7.2 Regression Results  
 
Table 5 presents the results of regression analysis which reveal the relationship 
between the performance (Tobin’s Q), the independent variables (DBT, OWN and 
O/C), and the controlled variables (FSize, FAge and FGrow). Before starting the 
regression analysis of the study, (χ2) and (F) tests were conducted on our Classical 
Linear Regression models. Both tests indicate that there is no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity problem. 
 
Table 5: Regression Results 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q measured by the total of market value plus the 
book value of the firm's preference shares plus the book value of the firm's over the 
total assets employed by the firm. The independent variables are: DBT measured by 
total debt over total assets; OWN measured by cash flow concentration; O/C 
measured by the deviation between control and ownership; Fsize measured by the 
natural log of the book value of total assets; F age measured by the natural log of the 
number of years since firm's inception; F grow is the annual growth rate in sales. 
 
Region 
European  
Countries 
French civil law  
Countries 
GS civil law  
Countries 
Common law  
Countries 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Equation Eq.(1) Eq.(2) Eq.(1) Eq.(2) Eq.(1) Eq.(2) Eq.(1) Eq.(2) 
DBT -0.1622 -0.1451 
-
0.1908** 
-0.2041* -0.1027 -0.0938 0.0413* 0.0262** 
DBT*(OWN) 0.1012 -------- -0.2339* -------- -0.1362* -------- 0.0152 -------- 
DBT*(O/C) -0.1823* -------- 
-
0.2755** 
-------- -0.1401 -------- 0.0321 -------- 
DBT*(OWN)
2
 -------- 0.1501 -------- 0.0189** -------- 0.1202 -------- 0.1064 
DBT*(O/C)
2
 -------- 
-
0.2452** 
-------- 
-
0.3454** 
-------- 
-
0.1311* 
-------- -0.0045 
OWN 0.0034 0.0035 0.0041* 0.0137** 0.0054* 0.0051 0.0027 0.0030 
O/C 
-
0.0136** 
-0.0143* 
-
0.0211** 
-0.0224* -0.0198* 
-
0.0201* 
-0.0121 -0.0116 
FSize 0.0110* 0.0123 0.0164* 0.0199 0.0186 0.0201 0.0113** 0.0156* 
FAge 0.0021 0.0019 0.0031 0.0021 0.0019* 0.0022 0.0021** 0.0016 
FGrow 0.0671** 0.0578* 0.0633* 0.0602* 0.0711** 0.0765* 0.0665* 0.0659** 
R
2
 0.5946 0.5422 0.5487 0.5075 0.5071 0.4861 0.4953 0.4739 
Adjusted R
2
 0.5145 0.4961 0.4376 0.4387 0.4406 0.4243 0.4661 0.4261 
F-statistic 7.7786 7.5641 6.7856 6.4605 6.8013 6.7456 7.2987 7.0785 
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N 5050 5050 2698 2698 685 685 1667 1667 
                                  *correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
                                  **correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
According to regressions 1 and 2 the relationships between debt and performance 
are negative and not significant. After dividing our main sample that consists of 
5050 firms to three subsamples, the results reveal two opposite impacts of debts. On 
the one hand, debt is related positively to the performance of listed firms in French 
civil law countries. On the other hand, there is a positive relationship between debt 
and the performance of listed firms in common law countries. These results suggest 
that debt is an important source of expropriation in French civil law countries while 
there is no evidence of expropriation through debt in GS civil law countries. At low 
level of legal protection, the managers may expropriate the minorities by increasing 
the debt’s level. The recent study of Bai et al. (2013) confirms that the expropriation 
of minorities is positively related to debt usage in fully-privatized firms. In the same 
line Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) show that the increasing of debt’s level has a 
significant negative affect on firm’s performance. 
 
Oppositely, in common law countries it seems that debts are used to increase the 
performance by eliminating the risks of expropriation and entrenchment. The 
evidence of debt in common law countries is consistent with the study of Harris and 
Raviv (1991) that supports the agency cost hypothesis by showing that higher debt 
can be used as a monitoring device.   
 
In order to explore the interaction between debt, performance and ownership 
concentration, two main variables are running with the performance. The first 
variable is DBT*OWN, detecting the risk of expropriation through debt at low level 
of ownership concentration while the second variable is DBT*OWN
2
 which is used 
to capture the risk of tunnelling through debt at high level of ownership 
concentration.   
 
In French civil law countries, a non-linear impact of debt is identified with 
ownership concentration while a positive and non-significant impact is pointed out 
in common law countries. In GS civil law countries, a negative impact of debt is 
found at low level of ownership concentration.  
 
The results lead to conclude that the risk of expropriation through debt exists in 
French and GS civil law countries specifically when ownership concentration is 
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widely dispersed. The explored impact of DBT*OWN in GS civil law countries is 
significantly lower than that of French civil law countries, suggesting a higher risk 
of expropriation in France, Spain and Italy.   
 
Regression 4 completes this evidence by demonstrating that the ownership 
concentration in French civil law countries rises as a proxy mechanism to limit the 
risk of expropriation which is consistent with the hypothesis (H4) which indicates 
that a high level of concentrated ownership reduces the risk of expropriation through 
debt.  
 
In common law countries, ownership is not used to constraint the expropriation of 
minorities but the high level of legal protection rises as an alternative system. The 
non-significant impact of the variable OWN in regressions 7 and 8 is consistent with 
this analysis.         
 
As for the impact of DBT*O/C on the performance of European firms, all the 
conducted regression in French civil law countries reveal that a high deviation 
between ownership and control leads the ultimate owner to use debts in order to 
expropriate the external shareholders. According to regressions 2, 4 and 6, a 
negative impact of debt is also detected when the level deviation between ownership 
and control comes to be more developed in GS and French civil law countries. From 
the results it can be argued that the negative impact of DBT*(O/C)
2
 in French and 
GS civil law countries is significantly higher than that of DBT*(O/C), suggesting a 
higher risk of expropriation through debts with higher level of deviation.  These 
results are consistent with the studies of La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio et al. (2002) 
and Classens et al. (2002) that show a high risk of expropriation and tunnelling in 
firms characterized by high degree of divergence between cash flows rights and 
control rights. The positive relationship between leverage and O/C (table 4) is also 
reliable with the hypothesis that debt facilitates tunnelling and expropriation. 
 
In common law countries, there is no significant impact of the deviation between 
ownership and control on the performance of listed firms. Moreover, from 
regressions 7 and 8 it seems that the impacts of DBT*(O/C) and DBT*(O/C)
2
 are 
not significant which means that the owners don’t use the debt to expropriate the 
external shareholders when the deviation between ownership and control exists. The 
high level of legal protection is employed as a disciplinary device to eliminate any 
risk of expropriation.   
 
Table 6 represents the global results of the study, showing how the macro and micro 
factors affect the relationship between capital structure and firms’ performance. 
Indeed, for countries with a low legal protection, financial structures are more likely 
to be used by owners to serve their private interests. For countries with high level of 
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legal protection, it seems that the financial market rises as proxy system to constraint 
any risk of expropriation and entrenchment.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: General results  
Hypotheses French GS Common 
law 
Countries Number Description Civil law  Countries 
H0 
There is a significant impact of leverage on the performance 
of listed firms 
Confirm 
Not 
Confirm 
Confirm 
H1 
In the case of low legal protection, there is a negative impact 
of leverage on the performance of listed firms 
Confirm 
Not 
confirm 
-------- 
H2 
In the case of high legal protection, there is a positive impact 
of leverage on the performance of listed firms 
----------- --------- Confirm 
H3 
A high level of concentrated ownership reduces the risk of 
expropriation through debt 
Confirm 
Not 
Confirm 
Confirm 
H4 
A high level of deviation between ownership rights and 
control rights increases the risk of expropriation through 
debt. 
Confirm Confirm 
Not 
Confirm 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Using the data of 5050 listed firms in European countries, this study is focusing on 
the financial impact of capital structure by considering the macro-environment 
system, more specifically the level of legal protection. After exploring the different 
regulations in Europe, we end up by three legal regimes: French civil law countries, 
English common law countries and finally German and Scandinavian (GS) civil law 
countries 
 
In countries with a low level of legal protection (such as France, Spain and Italy) 
corporate leverage is likely to be controlled by ultimate owners. At low level of 
ownership concentration, managers and ultimate owners try to use debt’s level in 
order to increase tunnelling, expropriation and entrenchment. At high level of 
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ownership concentration, ultimate owners use debts to constraint the entrenchment 
of managers and consequently increase the firm’s performance. In this low level of 
legal protection, firms are more exposed to expropriation through debts when there 
is a high level of deviation between cash-flow and control rights. This is more likely 
to occur when firm’s structure is organized as a pyramid.    
  
In common law countries the situation is totally different. The high level of legal 
protection decreases the levels of entrenchment, tunnelling and expropriation. In this 
case, financial market rises as a proxy system to constraint any opportunistic 
behavior and debts are also enrolled as a monitoring tool to increase the level 
performance. In such a market based system, hostile takeover and investor activism 
play a key role to discipline the managers and ultimate owners. Oppositely, in 
French civil law countries, capital markets are less protected which leads the 
ultimate owners to act as monitors to maximize the level of private profits. 
 
In GS civil law countries the results indicate that there is no impact of financial 
structure on the performance of listed firms when it’s measured by debt’s level. The 
interaction between ownership and financial structure indicates that at low level of 
ownership concentration a negative and significant impact of debt is found, showing 
a high risk of expropriation. This risk of expropriation is also detected when firms 
use a high level of deviation between ownership and control rights. However, all the 
results reveal a tendency of higher level of expropriation in French civil law 
countries then that of GS civil law countries (table 7) which is consistent with the 
study of La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Table 7: Comparisons of Impact between GS and French Civil Law Countries 
 
Variables Description 
Impact on the 
performance of 
GS civil law 
countries 
Sign 
Impact on the 
performance of 
French civil law 
countries 
DBT*OWN 
Using of debt at low level 
of concentration 
-0.2339* < -0.1362* 
DBT*(O/C)
2
 
Using of debt with high 
level of deviation 
between ownership and 
control 
-0.3454** < -0.1311* 
Results are extracted from table 5.  
 
The evidence of this study is very important but it could be developed over a longer 
period of time. The analysis should be improved by using two different types of debt 
120 
European Research Studies, XVII (3), 2014 
H. El-Chaarani 
 
such as short-term and long-term debt. Finally, more advanced criteria have to be 
considered to classify the different levels of legal protection.   
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